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Summary. Prodicus probably distinguished two stages in the 
development of religion: the phase of divinizing anything beneficial and 
the phase of divinizing the discoverers of beneficial inventions would 
be proclaimed divine. The primary innovation of the theory lies in the 
motive for an introduction of divinities, namely appreciation: what is 
appreciated can be divinized whether part of nature or something 
invented by men. 
 
Resumen. Pródico distinguía probablemente dos etapas en el desarrollo 
de la religión: la fase de divinización de algo beneficioso y la fase de 
divinización de los descubridores de invenciones beneficiosas, que 
serían proclamados divinos. La innovación principal de la teoría radica 
en el motivo para la  introducción de divinidades, a saber, la 
apreciación: lo que es apreciado puede ser divinizado, ya sea parte de la 




 Protagoras expressed his agnosticism with respect to the existence of the 
gods and their essence but did not deny the obvious fact of the existence of 
religion. In his mythological explanation, religion appeared at the dawn of 
humanity. By the presence of reason, people recognized their distinctive mark 
differentiating them from the animal world, and they saw in that rationality an 
infusion of something that stems from the higher plane, from the gods. Thus, the 
beginning of humanity is marked by the beginning of religion and only afterwards 
does the development of crafts take place.  
 Prodicus, a younger contemporary of Protagoras, does not have 
epistemological scruples in stating something about the gods, namely that they do 
not exist, and he brings the phenomenon of religion much closer to earth, in fact, 
quite literally. Prodicus “derived all of mankind’s sacrifices and mysteries and 
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cults from the fair works of tillage since, in his opinion … the idea of the gods 
comes to men in this way” (Themistius, Or. 30 = B5). The key to the emergence 
of religion is usefulness. 
Prodicus is said to have distinguished two stages in the development of 
religion.1 In the first stage, “the things that nourish and benefit us were first 
acknowledged and honored as gods.” The beneficial things included “the sun, the 
moon, and rivers and springs and in general anything that is beneficial to our life 
because of the benefit derived from them, just as the Egyptians [deify] the Nile” 
(SE 9.18 = B5). In the second phase, people who benefited others – “discoverers 
of foods and shelter and other skills” – were elevated to divine status (Persaeus, 
ap. Philodemus, De pietate col. 9 = B5). According to another source, “Prodicus 
says that those were accepted as gods who, when wandering, contributed to 
human welfare with discoveries of new crops” (Minucius Felix, Octavius 21.2). 
That is, in the first phase, anything beneficial would be a subject of divinization, 
in the second phase, the discoverers of beneficial inventions would be 
proclaimed divine. The second phase places the emphasis of human impact on 
the development of human civilization – particularly in the area of agriculture; 
the first phase treats on a par natural entities and entities created by men. This 
would reflect the Sophist view of the development of human society from simple 
and disorganized to more developed and civilized as reflected in the myth of 
Protagoras. It could be, in fact, possible that the view of two stages in the 
development of religion was accepted by Prodicus.  
Prodicus uses ethnographic data from different parts of the world and, to 
some extent, performs research in comparative religion. In particular, he uses 
data from Greek fertility cults, from Egypt where the Nile is worshipped, and 
probably from Persian religion he uses data concerning the veneration of the sun, 
moon, earth, fire, water, and winds as did Herodotus (1.131.2); the mysteries to 
which he refers are doubtless Eleusinian mysteries and probably other cults, such 
as Thesmophoria.2 However, Greek religion, in particular, could be used in 
justifying the validity of Prodicus’ theory of religion. For the Greeks, the sun 
(Helios) and the moon (Artemis or Selene) are gods and so are rivers – for 
example, Achelous (Homer, Il. 21.194), Xanthus, i.e., Scamander (5. 77-78, 
20.74), and Spercheius (16.174). The divinities of the first phase are still 
recognized and still worshipped.  
                                                           
1 The two-stage theory of religious development was first claimed for Prodicus by 
Wilhelm Nestle, Bemerkungen zu den Vorsokratikern und Sophisten, Philologus 67 
(1908), 556-558. 
2 Albert Henrichs, The Sophists and Hellenistic religion: Prodicus as the spiritual father of 
the Isis aretalogies, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 88 (1984), 143-144. 
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As to the second phase in the development of religion, it is enough to 
notice that popular religion presented the gods as givers of particular goods. For 
example, Athena was a goddess not only of wisdom but also of weaving, 
spinning, making pots, and building ships. Triptolemus was considered a son of 
Uranus, but some viewed him as a man who was made a god after death. He gave 
grain and culture to men and taught the use of the plough; he traveled all over the 
world to teach people how to grow wheat and corn. Aristaeus, a son of Apollo, 
taught people how to keep bees, raise vines and olives and invented bookkeeping. 
Demeter was a goddess of agriculture, productive soil, and fruitfulness of 
mankind. Dionysus was a god of wine. Hermes was a god of trade, travelers, 
commerce, and manual skill. Hestia was a goddess of the hearth. That much was 
uncontroversial. What was new in Prodicus’ theory was reducing the gods to 
human status. They were givers of goods, but human givers, not divine. They 
were proclaimed to be gods by grateful men, and so, in reality, they are gods only 
in name, not in essence. The gods are thus men called gods; the gods are but a 
human invention. 
The sources mention Prodicus’ reference to specific deities. However, 
the sources are not in agreement on at what stage they emerged. Philodemus 
reports that according to Prodicus, Demeter and Dionysus are deified 
discoverers, and Sextus says that “bread was called Demeter, wine Dionysus,” 
etc. because of their usefulness (9.18). It seems incongruous that Prodicus would 
at the same time say that Demeter is a deified person and deified bread. An 
explanation could be that Demeter was the name of a discoverer of bakery and 
Dionysus the name of a discoverer of winery, and so their names were used for 
the products of their inventions, which were also divinized. After all, Homer used 
the name of a god for a substance associated with a god when he said that “they 
spitted the entrails and held them over Hephaestus” (Il. 2.426). Prodicus could 
claim that divinization of discoveries may have been followed by divinization of 
discoverers with retaining the same name. In particular, the divinized bread was 
called Demeter, and then the name was transferred to the discoverer of bread.3 
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As interesting as the problem of the existence of two phases in Prodicus’ 
theory may be, it is of secondary importance. The primary innovation of the 
theory lies in the motive for an introduction of divinities. For his contemporary, 
Democritus, when he said that popular religion attributed divinity to various 
natural phenomena such as lightning, conjunction of stars, or eclipses of the sun, 
the motive was fear because people were afraid of them (SE 9.24 = 68A75).4 For 
Prodicus, it was appreciation5: what is appreciated can be divinized whether part 
of nature or something invented by men. The sun or water in general or a 
particular body of water is greatly appreciated as something that enables the very 
life of any living being and thus is divinized. Bread and wine, appreciated as 
maintaining and enhancing human life, are divinized as well. 
It is interesting to observe that for Socrates and for the Stoics, the 
existence of useful things was a testimony of the beneficence of the gods, of 
divine providence, and of the existence of the gods. For Prodicus, it is the other 
way around: the existence of useful and beneficial things led to the creation of 
the gods by man. He could say that the existence of the gods is a proof of the 
existence of beneficial things in nature. An analysis of a society’s mythology 
would reveal what is useful for the society although Prodicus would probably 
add that some connections between particular divinities and useful things could 
become obscured by time. 
Does this make Prodicus an atheist? Prodicus’ theory was espoused 
much later by Persaeus, a minor Stoic, who, according to Philodemus, was 
clearly “doing away with the divine or was a complete agnostic about it.” The 
statement, however, seems to be too strong. The Stoics were keenly interested in 
demythologization of popular religion, but they were nevertheless believers in 
the existence of God who is in control of the events in the universe.6 Also, before 
Prodicus, explanations of human origin of popular religion were undertaken by 
                                                           
4 For Democritus, fear was also a source of various ideas considered the afterlife 
(Stobaeus 4.52.40 = 68B297). 
5 According to Prodicus, “the sense of gratitude based on the assessment of value is the 
source of religion,” Andrzej Bańkowski, Prodikos z Keos i jego teoria religii, Euhemer 6 
(1962), no. 3, 17. 
6 Adam Drozdek, Theology of the Early Stoa, Emerita 71 (2003), 88-89. Also, Cicero 
presents Persaeus’ views in the context of discussing views of other Stoics, whereas 
Prodicus’ views are presented among those who “utterly undermine all religion”; cf. 
Bańkowski, op. cit., 20; Bernd Effe, Προτέρε γενερή – eine stoische Hesiod-
Interpretation in Arats Phainomena, Rheinisches Museum 113 (1970), 179 note 51. 
According to later Stoics, those who benefited mankind “were translated to heaven 
through their fame and our gratitude” (Cicero, ND 2.62). 
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writers who did not reject the sphere of the divine, to mention only Xenophanes. 
Explanation of the human origin of the gods can very well be reconciled with 
religious beliefs. It is thus theoretically possible that Prodicus could be a believer 
in nontraditional deity or deities.7 However, this is highly unlikely. Sextus 
includes him on a short list of those who are called atheoi, i.e., those who say 
that God does not exist (SE 9.51 = B5), which means that it was not just Sextus’ 
opinion that Prodicus was an atheist. Sextus is the only source in which Prodicus 
is explicitly called atheos. However, Prodicus’ religious nonconformity is 
mentioned more than once. Already in his times, Aristophanes mentions him 
derisively as being praised by the Clouds after they appear on the scene as new 
deities (Clouds 360-361 = A5) and when he mentions him in the company of 
corrupting books and babblers (fr. 490 = A5). Also, Plato referred to him as 
Tantalus (Prot. 315bc). This is because Tantalus became a paradigm of 
“hubristic audacity” and “hubris against the gods,” a parasitical blasphemer, and 
so Prodicus is presented as an arch-blasphemer.8 Finally, a fragment of 
Philodemus’ De pietate, PHerc fr. 19, explicitly states that Prodicus maintains 
that the gods of popular religion do not exist.9 Still, an argument ex silentio could 
be made that he did not deny the existence of all possible divine beings and that 
he could have maintained that a divinity such as Anaximander’s Apeiron or 
Anaxagoras’ Mind exists. However, it is very unlikely that Prodicus made such 
an argument and the argument was not recorded. But a slim possibility exists that 
no testimony simply survived. The example of Xenophanes indicates that the 
denial of traditional gods can be reconciled with an arguably grander theological 
vision than traditional polytheism. Anaxagoras and Socrates are examples of 
philosophers who, notwithstanding their theology, were considered atheists10 and 
were accused of impiety. However, their theological views are known to us, and 
it is certain that atheism meant disbelieve in the traditional image of the gods, not 
complete disbelief in the existence of any divinity. Therefore, because there is no 
trace of Prodicus’ positive theology, considering Prodicus as an atheist seems to 
be rather well founded. 
                                                           
7 The view that he could have been “an ardent worshipper of the gods of popular religion” 
(Marek Winiarczyk, Methodisches zum antiken Atheismus, Rheinisches Museum 133 
(1990), 7) can be defended if the worship was done for social or cultural, but not for 
religious, reasons. 
8 C.W. Willink, Prodikos, ‘meteorosophists’ and the ‘Tantalos’ paradigm, Classical 
Quarterly 33 (1983), 31-33. 
9 Henrichs, op. cit., 107; Albert Henrichs, The atheism of Prodicus, Cronache Ercolanesi 
6 (1976), 15, 20. 




For this reason, it is very much in doubt that Prodicus “reserved a place 
for the gods.”11 He mentions that reality is to be constituted by gods and how 
kindly they look upon those who persevere (Xenophon, Mem. 2.1.27-28 = B2), 
but the statements are made in a fictionalized conversation of Virtue and Vice 
with Heracles and so they have as much value about the true belief of Prodicus in 
the gods as the myth from the Protagoras has about true beliefs of Protagoras in 
the gods. Moreover, it is purely speculative that “Prodicus tries to reconcile 
popular religion and philosophy in some fashion without annihilating in the 
supreme power of the God of Nature the separate gods who are in some way his 
manifestations.”12 There is no trace of Prodicus’ belief in the God of Nature and 
if he did express such a belief, the result of the reconciliation would be 
unacceptable for the religious because the gods would be removed from the 
world scene altogether. In this way, God would be manifested by natural 
resources and by inventive people only; therefore, the God of Nature would 
dissolve in Nature and in the social realm. 
 Prodicus assumes that man is a rational being because a measure of 
rationality is necessary to invent rites, cults, and deities representing things 
beneficial in life. Animals do not have religion because they are not rational, 
although, to paraphrase Xenophanes, if they could draw, they would make 
images of gods representing things beneficial to them. For most of them, they 
would be, as for humans, the moon, sun, and water. But in addition to those, for 
oxen would be hay, for bears would be honey, and for bees would be flowers.  
 The origin of religion according to Protagoras hardly lends itself to a 
rational explanation. Religion emerges first and then emerge language and 
different practical skills. The role of religion is also unclear if a sociological 
explanation is attempted. Prodicus removes any unclarity. By claiming that “the 
idea of the gods” is derived from “the fair works of the tillage,” Prodicus closes 
the door on the possibility that maybe the divine sphere exists – at least the 
sphere of traditional divinities – but is inaccessible for human cognition. The 
otherworldly sphere is removed from Prodicus’ universe. Religion is pure 
invention of men who elevate to the divine status what and who is useful: useful 
things and human benefactors. Prodicus is original in this because he is the only 
Sophist to deify human inventors. 
 The reason for choosing usefulness in his explanation of the 
phenomenon of religion may also be quite prosaic. Prodicus appears to have been 
                                                           
11 Jacqueline de Romilly, The great Sophists in Periclean Athens, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1992, 194; she is right, however, when she says that Prodicus “offers an 
anthropological and positivist explanation” of religion, p. 107. 
12 Mario Untersteiner, The Sophists, New York: Philosophical Library 1954, 211. 
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touched by megalomania: it is hardly possible that any shy and modest teacher 
would charge the exorbitant fee of 50 drachmas for his lessons so that only a few 
could afford them.13 To be sure, such prices need to be justified somehow, and 
the usefulness would be certainly a top reason to pay for the lessons. This was 
not an unimportant problem for the Sophists as seen in Plato’s account of 
longwinded justification given by Protagoras that, in spite of the fact that 
everyone is endowed with the political virtue necessary for the existence of the 
city, a Sophist is needed to set the city and its citizens on the right course. 
Prodicus may have gone further in such a justification by suggesting that 
usefulness was so appreciated by all peoples that it led to the emergence of 
religion. All religions witness to the veneration of the benefactors of people. 
Such benefactors are discoverers in civic engineering, cooking, and various 
“useful skills.” Prodicus himself was renowned for his linguistic studies, in 
particular, the problem of synonymy. Using this skill, he certainly could teach his 
pupils more than they could say in prose. For him, this certainly was a useful 
skill and worthy of charging high fees. Therefore, a claim can be made that 
among the ones elevated to divine status are also the Sophists of old.14 The honor 
paid to them sufficiently justifies the usefulness of the Sophists. Furthermore, it 
is not impossible that Prodicus saw himself as a candidate for such an elevation 
by his contemporaries if only because he saw himself as a discoverer of the skill 
of discourse (Plato, Phaedr. 267b = A20). And, to some extent, he got his wish 
when Plato, probably tongue in cheek,15 called him divine (θεÃος, Prot. 316a = 
A2; θεσπέσιος, Theaet. 151b = A3a). 
                                                           
13 Plato, Crat. 384b = A11; Aristotle, Rhet. 1415b15-17 = A12. Cf. the opinion that he 
was fond of making money, Philostratus, Soph. 1.12 = A1. 
14 Protagoras says that the Sophist’s art is ancient (Plato, Prot. 316d), an opinion which 
Prodicus very well may have shared. A possibility of divinizing philosophers is mockingly 
mentioned by Sextus 9.41 and immediately dismissed as ludicrous. It may not have been 
so ludicrous to Prodicus. 
15 Zeller’s claim that Plato mentions Prodicus in his dialogues only mockingly is 
documented by Richard Heinze, Über Prodikos aus Keos, Berichte über die 
Verhandlungen der Königlich Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, 
Philologisch-historische Classe 36 (1884), 315-335. 
